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Howard Johnson's: Rise and Fall of an American Icon
Abstract

The Howard Johnson’s restaurant chain was one of the first franchise success stories in the United States.
Climbing in size to be over 1,000 restaurants, the chain today boasts fewer than 30 units. How could such a
successful company spiral downward to virtually nothing? This article examines the history of the chain and
offers reasons for its success and demise.
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Howard Johnson's: Rise
and fall of an American icon
by William Crandall and
John A. Parnell

The Howard Johnson's restaurant chain
was one of the fi& fmchise success
stones in the United States. ClLnbingin size
to over 1.000 restaurants, the chain tcday
boasts fewer than 30 units. HOW could such
a successfu~company spiral dodownwrd to
Mihrally nothing? This article examines the
history of the chain and offen reasons for its
success and demise.

T

he Howard Johnson's restaurant chain was once an
American icon. Rising to over
a thousand units, the familiar
orange roofs, 28 flavors of ice cream,
fried clams, unique frmkfurters,
and decent, yet generic food, has
satisfied weary travelers since
1925. And yet today fewer than 30
restaurants remain.'
How could such a large empire
crumble to virtually nothing? What
lessons can be learned from the rise
and decline? Could any of today's
large, stable chains be the next to
fall? Such questions are not just for
the nostalgic road traveler.
Management scholars, business
Crandall and Parnell

practitioners, and students can also
the ~~~~d
benefit by
restaurant
Fo*unately, there are some good lessons
that can be gleaned as well. ARer
all, a
that can withstand a
depression, a World War, and gasoline shortages in the 'IOs, must
have been doing some things right.
American icon debuts

Ironically, Howard Johnson
entered the restaurant industry in
order to pay off debts from a failed
. ~ 1925, he
cigar-selling v e n t ~ r e In
bought a small soda shop in Quincy,
Massachusetts. The store, left to
him by his father, sold three flavors
of ice cream: chocolate, strawbeny,
and vanilla. He decided to experiment with the quality of the ice
cream by using hand-cranked
makers and doubling the butterfat
of the product.' The resulting ice
cream-with 16 percent butterfat
and 28 flavors-was popular with
his customers,and sales at the store
increased dramatically. Johnson
23
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expanded operations by opening a
second store in Wollaston, Massachusetts, in 1927 and a third in
Natasket Beach, Massachusetts,
the following year. He also started
selling food items such as
hamburgers and frankfurkrs a t his
original store. All three stores did
well, but Johnson was still in debt
and was not ready for expansion.'
In 1929, Johnson opened a
second restaurant in Quincy. This
store had a broader menu and laid
the groundwork for future expansion. However, with the oncoming
depression, growth plans were put
on hold while Johnson re-thought
his vision. In his mind, the future of
American eateries centered around
the popularity of automobiles and
improved roadway^.^ His thinking
was that Americans would take to
the roads more and want good food
along the way.
Franchising is born
In 1935, Howard Johnson
teamed up with local businessman Reginald Sprague and
created the first modern-day
restaurant franchise.-he
idea
was new in that day-let an operator use the name, food, supplies,
and logo, in exchange for a fee. By
1941, the chain had grown to 150
units and was poised for growth,
most of which occurred along the
Atlantic Coast, and into Florida.'
The placing of restaurants on the
route to Florida was especially
strategic because travelers
wanted a predictable meal a t a
predictable price."
Howard Johnson faced a second

crisis following the depression:
World War 11. The impact on the
chain was tremendous. Food
rationing, gasoline restrictions, and
less travel by Americans nearly
forced the chain into bankruptcy?
All but 10 of the 90 existing restaurants were closed,'"but the
company itself survived by catering
to the military and schools. After
the war, closed restaurants were
reopened and new ones were built.
Growth is in the East
One of the f i s t areas of growth
was along the Pennsylvania Turnpike, where restaurants were
placed at approximately 50-mile
intervals. Growth also continued
with the franchising of stores in
other areas, mostly in the eastern
United States. The main concentration of restaurants was in the
greater Boston, New York City, and
Philadelphia areas."
By 1954, the chain boasted 400
restaurants and was ready to enter
the lodging industry. During this
same year, Howard Johnson
opened his f i s t motel in Savannah,
Georgia. The combination of a
motel and restaurant on the same
property proved popular as growth
continued throughout the entire
country, and on into Canada and
Puerto Rico.IZ
Johnson's son, Howard B.
Johnson, took over the company in
1959 and was given the charge by
his father to "make it grow."I3 The
restaurant chain topped the 1,000
mark by the late 1970s, with about
500 motor lodges as well.
The 1980s proved to be critical
FIU Hospitality Review
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years to the chain." Competition
from fast food restaurants ate away
at market share and Howard
Johnson's began to show a need for
re-inventing itself. The company
was sold in 1980 to a British fm,
The Imperial Group, for $630
million. The sale included 1,040
restaurants and 520 motor lodges.'"
The Imperial Gmup struggled to
position the chain successfully in
the competitive market of the
1980s. Sales remained flat and
operating income was dropping.'"
In 1985, the company was sold
again, this time to the Marriott
Corporation." Marriott sold 199
franchised
restaurants
and
retained the 418 company stores,
later converting them to its own
"Bob's Big Boy" concept.'"M&oLt
also sold all of the Howard
Johnson's lodging units to Prime
Motor Inns. In 1990, the lodging
chain was sold to Blackstone Hospitality Franchise System.'"
In 1986, a group of franchisees,
concerned about the Maniott
strategy of selling off or converting
restaurants to other concepts,
formed their own company called
Franchise Associates, Inc. (FAI).
Located in South Weymouth,
Massachusetts, FA1 currently
owns the right to operate the
Howard Johnson name and
product in relationship to the original restaurant concept.
Howard Johnson's can be
viewed in terms of two separate, yet
related industries, restaurants and
lodging. Today, the lodging side of
the business, under the management of Cendant Corporation, is

doing well.'" However, the restaurant side struggles for survival.
Marketing is success
Howard Johnson's restaurants
were placed in high traffic areas for
greater visibility. The orange roof
was meant to be an advertising logo
in itself, one that could be seen from
a distance?>The Simple Simon and
the Pieman logo located on the
large highway signs was a distinctive marketing ~uccess.2~
The placing of restaurants on
the Pennsylvania Turnpike was
.~
another marketing s u c ~ e s s The
turnpike was the first modern
superhighway
and
Howard
Johnson's was the first major
restaurant chain. This marriage
helped identify Johnson with
"progressive engineering.*' Eventually, the turnpike expansion
included roadways in Connecticut,
Illinois, Kansas, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, and Oklahoma.""

Management mix varies
The restaurant industry can be
segmented in several ways for planning and market research
purposes?%e
such depiction is
illustrated in Table 1. The matrix
segments service into three levels:
low, medium, and high. Menu
variety is also segmented into three
levels of low, medium, and high.
The type of eating establishment is
placed in its corresponding box
according to scnice level and menu
variety. Howard Johnson's is represented in the medium service,
medium menu variety segment.
During the 1970s,the majority of
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Table 1
Segmentation of restaurant industry
Service IeveU
menu variety

service

I

Low
variety

Fast food
restaurants
Drive-ins

Medium
variety

High
variety

Diners

Cafeterias

Coffee shop &
Medium
Service

Specialty
restaurants

High
Service

Concept
restaurants

restaurants
(Howard
Johnson's)
Upscale dinner
houses

Casual-dining
restaurants

restaurants
(gourmet)

Source: Adapted from J. Jakle & K. Sculle,Fast food: Roadside restaurants of

the automobile age (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 19991, 85.
restaurants built were represented challenge, Howard Johnson's diverin the top two rows of the matrix. sified its appeal. In the 1970s, the
However, the 1980s and 1990s saw chain opened the Ground Round, a
more chains expanding into the more upscale concept, aimed at the
segments represented by the lower family market. By 1984,there were
row of the matrix."
225 Ground Rounds operating, and
The 1970s saw Howard most of them were profitable." In
Johnson's hit with competition the 1980s,four other concepts were
from many fronts. Competition experimented with: Paddywacks,
was especially strong from chains Bumbershoots, Pickle Lilys, and
that focused on a particular niche Deli Baker-Ice Cream Maker.
such as Wendy's (hamburgers), Paddywacks was a coffee shop,
Long John Silver's (seafood), or while Bumbershoots and Pickle
KFC (fried chicken). These firms Lilys were designed to compete in
are represented in the low service, the theme restaurant segment.
low menu variety segment of Table Deli-Baker-Ice Cream Maker was
1. Service from these chains was an upscale deli with emphasis on
faster and prices were o h n lower take-out and premium beers.la
than what Howard Johnson's These outlets were not widely
could offer2"
successful, and enthusiasm for the
In order to meet the competitive restaurants eventually waned
26
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to open a newrestaurant, he started
&anchising aggressively. Initially,
he was able to open one company
store for every 10 franchised stores.
In the late 1930s, this number had
grown to two company stores for
every 10 franchised units.3BBy
1940, the chain boasted 130 restaur a n t ~ . ~Growth
'
was strong in the
1930s, but then, World War I1
almost forced the company into
bankruptcy. ARer the war, closed
units were re-opened and new ones
were built. Surviving a depression
and a major world war prompted
Johnson, and later his son, to be
conservative in matters of cash
flow.""ohnson had been in debt in
hs early years of growing the chain,
and he did not want to be plagued
by it later on. As a result, the
company grew in the 1950s and
Finance leads to growth
Ironically, Howard Johnson 1960s through cash flow from operstarted in business because he was ations, rather than by taking on
in debt h m a previous business debt. By the 1970s, the company
venture. He started his first restau- had cash reserves of $90 milli~n."~
rant in 1925with $2,500 in wnrking
capital to pay off a $42,000 debt."' Working manager is key
Even as his chain was growing, he
The "working manager"
took his time paying back his mdi- concept was used a t Howard
tors. He once commented that his Johnson's restaurant^.^ Managers
"suppliers were his creditors" and were expected to perform manual
that "debts aren't anything to wony labor and pitch in as needed.
about if you can show the people you Cutting labor cost was a priority at
owe that you have a definite plan b the unit level; therefore, managers
pay them off, and if you look like a were expected to work side by side
man with gumption enough to carry with employees in order to keep the
the plan through.""
number of employees a t a
In 1935, Johnson wanted to minimum.
grow his company, but lacked the
Bonuses to managers were paid
necessary funds. Ironically, it was on the basis of cutting costs."'
this dilemma that led to the Managerial salaries were generally
massive franchising growth that below market, and hours were long.
followed. Lacking the cash needed Because of these conditions, graduwhen the Imperial Group revealed
its plans in 1984 to dispose of the
Howard Johnson's company"
Various menu upgrades, long
overdue, were undertaken at the
original Howard Johnson's restaurants during the 1980s. One of the
key changes was to allow individual
unitsto serve regional favorites. For
example, pot roast was featured in
the Northeast, while chicken and
dumplings were sold in the South."
As the 1990s approached, menus
were also altered to include more
healthy fare such as oat bran
muffins, fresh fruit and yogurt platters, and low cholesterolitems. New
items were added, including
upscale salads and innovative ice
cream flavor^."^
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ates of hotel and restaurant schools
were apprehensive about careers
with Howard Johnson's.
The elder Howard Johnson's
style of management was one of
fear and intimidation. His son,
Howard B. Johnson, once
commented, "He never took a
breath for 40 years, and he didn't
think much of anybody who did. He
was aggressive and demanding,but
if you kept step with him, he was a
very big supporter.""
Layout, design fit format
The restaurant typi6ed what is
known as the coffee shop style of
layout. It represented a merger of a
soda fountain on one side of the
building with a more formal dining
room on the other."Desserts and
ice cream were assembled from the
counter, while regular menu items
were processed in the kitchen.
Customers entered through a
vestibule and were greeted by a
host or hostess in the center of the
building. A cash register and ice
cream displays were located in this
small waiting area, with the
counter with stool-type seats at the
right. To the left was the dining
room with booths or tables with
chairs. Some restaurants had additional dining rooms added on to the
side of the building where the main
dining room was located.
The decor of the restaurant
featured the orange roof and blue
and white sign. Aweathervane was
perched on the roof and the Simple
Simon and the Pieman logo
adorned the entrance of the
building. Although various building

styles existed, most still followed
the coffee shop format. In the 1990s,
design changes with the building
and interior took place with the aim
of reflecting a more modem look.
The orange roof remains, but new
color schemes were added to
include white, orange, and teal
blue. An updated store in Canton,
Massachusetts, included a triangular arch over the entrance with
colorful banners and flags."
Operations stress control
Howard Johnson's used a
commissary approach to supplying
its restaurants, thus reflecting a
degree of vertical integration.
Food items were originally
produced in a manufacturing
facility in Wollaston, Massachusetts, and then trucked to individual restaurants where they
were "finished by short order
cooks. This approach was utilized
in order to keep consistency and
control uniform over a large
geographical area.a It also offered
the advantage of economies of
scale which helped reduce costs."
As the chain expanded, more
commissaries were built. It was
the commissaries - not the restaurants - that eventually turned out
to be the most profitable part of
the business."
The items delivered to restaurants were mostly in h z e n form
and included ice cream and entrees.
At the restaurant, cooks used a
short order approach to food preparation. Only three main methods of
food preparation prevailed at the
unit level: fiyhg, baking, and gridFIU Hospitality Review
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dling.'"eep
fat fryers were used
on the famous clams and fish
items, as well as French fries.
Ovens and microwaves heated up
frozen items and steam tables kept
food warm. Grills were used to
prepare the well-known frankfurters. as well as hambureers.
.,
Expensive labor was not needed in
the kitchen since the actual recipes
were prepared at the commissary.
Operations at the unit level of
the restaurant were highly systemized. The "Howard Johnson Bible"
outlined all rules and procedures on
how to run the restaurant."' Later,
Ray Kroc would follow this practice
of operating "by the book" in the
running of McDonald's.
Lessons are learned
Howard Johnson's definitely
did many things right. Although a
number of lessons can be learned
from this successful chain, there
are four that are prominent.
First model: The Howard
Johnson's franchise system offered
the first model of how a successful
restaurant chain should grow. The
restaurant franchise success
formula began with Howard
Johnson's. Although there were
other franchises available in the
food service industry, Howard
Johnson's was the first to expand to
such a large size. What made the
chain successful was its emphasis
on consistency and proper location
of stores. The orange roof, the same
menu in each restaurant, and the
placing of restaurants at high
traffic locations all contributed to
franchise success.

His son, Howard B. Johnson,
commented, "He was the first
person to realize there was very
limited food service on the U. S.
highways. He also realized early on
you should develop a product line
that was consistent so people would
trust it,"5o
Alternate markets: A company can survive during critical
times by looking for alternate
markets. Howard Johnson can be
credited as one of the &st entrepreneurs to think "outside the box."
When faced with debt and the
perilous years of the depression, he
viewed the kanchise relationship
as an innovative solution. When
faced with massive eas rationing.
and the problems of world War G;
he sold his products to alternate
markets, i.e., the military.After the
elder Howard Johnson's retirement, his son continued his legacy
by expanding the chain rapidly and
looking at markets outside the
coffee shop restaurant segment.
The Ground Round and Red Coach
Grill concepts were successful
attempts at diversification within
the restaurant industry.
Consistency: Consistency of
operations is necessary for
successful chain
expansion.
Although taken for granted today,
Howard Johnson's was the first
major chain to illustrate the need
for a consistent level of service and
product quality? Predictab'ity was
important to the traveling public
during the 1950s and 1960s. Few
restaurants at the t i e offered a
consistent product and service over

Crandall and Parnell
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such a wide geographical area.
Whiie it is tme that modern chains
like McDonald's have since taken
this concept to new heights, the
core competency of consistent
product delivery was initiated with
Howard Johnson's.
Success multiplies: The

success of one chain can lead to the

b i i and expansion of other chains.
The success of Howard Johnson's
directly led to the expansion of
Dunkin Donuts. William Rosenburg, founder of Dunkin Donuts,
once commented, "I saw what he
(Howard Johnson) was doing with
franchisingand thought it was such
a good idea; he became the impetus
for me. The only guy I saw move so
fast was Howard Johnson. He was
the No. 1food operation in the early
1950s and had been going since the
1930s."" Other chains, motivated
by the lure of success, entered the
restaurant industry and expanded
aggressively. McDonald's, Burger
King, Denny's, and others soon
found that they could compete and
expand in a growing competitive
market.
Lessons learned from fall

Unfortunately for Howard
Johnson's, its most powerful
lessons are derived from its decline.
Four are especially noteworthy.
Success not ensured: Past
success does not ensure future
success and can actually lead to
demise. When Howard Johnson's
was at its peak in growth, few
would have suggested that the
chain might someday have fewer
30

than 60 restaurants. After all,
Howard Johnson's represented an
American success story with
humble roots beginning in 1925.
The company was a symbol of how
a hardworking entrepreneur could
be successful in America. Howard
B. Johnson once commented, "I've
met a handful of smart men in my
lifetime, and he was one of the
brightest I ever met. He was an
American entrepreneur, one of the
fellas that helped build this country.
This country breeds these types of
people, and thank God it does.""
Nonetheless, the chain fell and
fell hard. Critics of the chain noted
that for years the company was not
innovating or responding to
changes in the industry."' Are there
large restaurant chains today that
could follow suit? One would question whether successful ventures
like McDonald's, Wendy's, or
Denny's could ever fad. Indeed,
back in the 1960s, many probably
thought it would never happen to
Howard Johnson's either.
The success of Howard
Johnson's revolutionized the
restaurant, lodging, and franchise
delivery systems. It also brought on
a new threat, competition. With
Howard Johnson's as a role model,
other chains soon entered the
industry and created a crowded and
competitive environment. Soon,
only the strongest companies
survived. Herein lies one of the
ironies of the marketplace; impressive success can lead to organizational decline.""
Indeed, the list of successful
restaurant chains which ran into
FIU Hospitality Review
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trouble is a long one, and would also
include such names as Rax, ChiChi's, Steak & Ale, Checkers, and
Sambds?6 In the case of Howard
Johnson's, the chain grew to more
than 1,000 units in ihe 1970s.
Howard Johnson motels, which
were adjacent to many restaurants,
helped ensure a steady source of
customers. This comfortable
arrangement, plus a good brand
name in the eyes of the public, led
to an "it can't happen to us" attitude. Decline resulted when new
competition entered the marketplace and the chain failed to adjust
to these changes.
Management complacency is a
serious problem for many
successful organizations. When
things are going well, decision
makers tend not to critically assess
problem areas that could lead to
future problems."' As PinPBput it,
"Fix it even if it's not broken" is an
axiom that is inherent to the
restaurant business.

watched helplessly as the competition passes them by. Baskin
Robbins took market share away
because Howard Johnson's did not
expand into downtown ice cream
parlors. Stouffers took away business from the commissary frozen
food side of the company because
Howard Johnson's did not want to
invest additional money.5g
The situation was worse in the
actual
restaurant
industry.
Competitors like McDonald's, Long
John Silver, and KFC came in with
better quality products at lower
prices. Instead of battling the
competition, Howard Johnson's
chose to stand still with the same
menu and same concept that had
existed for years. This strategy
could not have come at a worse
time. The restaurant industry was
expanding and competition was
heavy The result was a shakeout of
weaker competitors. Smaller
chains collapsed altogether, while
d
large chains like ~ o w a r johnson's
shrank dramatically.

Reinvestment necessary:

Reinvesting profits into the organization is fundamental to meeting
the demands of a changing market.
Howard Johnson was weary of
debt. He started the company in
debt and franchised because he did
not have cash to expand. The result
in later years was a conservative
approach to management by
building up large cash reserves and
not spending it on innovation. This
approach proved to be instrumental
in the downfall of the chain.
Without investments in the
changing market, the chain

Value needed: Failure to
provide value and an overemphasis
on cost cutting can drive away
customers. During the 1960s and
70s, Howard Johnson's became
more focused on real estate, bottom
line profits, and stockholder^.^"
While these factors are essential to
running a restaurant chain, the
overemphasis led to lost customers.
The quality of food, service, and
cleanliness declined, which led to a
loss in market hare.^'
Restaurants were asked to
squeeze payroll, consewe water by
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letting the customer ask for it, and
removing pla~emats.~"ven the
competition noticed the pre-occupation with cost cutting. '%very time I
saw Howard Johnson he was
always telling me how he was going
to cut costs further," remarked one
competitor. "I don't think he spent
enough time at his restaurants. If
he'd eaten in his own restaurants
more instead of lunching at '21 ,' he
might have learned ~omething."~
In many respects, delivering
value simply refers to doing the
basics well. Like other restaurant
chains that experienced similar
dilKculties, Howard Johnson's food
quality depreciated over time, and
"menu fatigue" resulted &om the
lack of enhancement of food offeri n g ~ The
. ~ overemphasis on cost
containment resulted in decreased
speed, professionalism, and restaurant ambiance.
Competitiveness needed:
Ultimately, a company must
develop the appropriate business
strategy in order to stay competitive. From the founding of the
company until the late 1960s,
Howard Johnson's was operating in
the right market niche - the coffeehousdfamily restaurant segment of
the industry. But as the 1970s
progressed, the company was
suffering with aging restaurants
and a decaying market niche.66
Efforts were made to expand into
more sophisticated markets with
Red Coach Grills and Ground
Round restaurants. On the whole,
these efforts were successful.
In the 1970s,Howard Johnson's
32

was reorganized into two restaurant divisions, the Orange Roof and
the Specialty Restaurant Division.' The Orange Roof Division
consisted of Howard Johnson's
restaurants, New Edition, The
Choice if Yours, Turnpike Unites,
and Truck Stops. The Specialty
Restaurant Division consisted of
Ground Round, Red Coach Grills,
and a concept called Lucky Lil's.AU
were upscale concepts that focused
more on higher check averages and
liquor sales.
In spite of the diversification
attempts, the company could not
seem to implement a coherent
strategy. Howard B. Johnson was
worried about repositioning the
company as the 1980s approached."'
He admitted that changes were
taking place, but he was not really
sure where the industry was
heading. Johnson commented:
We all want the dinner business,
but you have those horrible
margins involved in putting out
the plate. So we have to sell a lot
of liquor, but in a coffee shop you
can't sell more than seven or
eight percent liquor. I don't have
the key yet. I'm sure that we're
making the right long-term
mwes, but I don't have the key
to shrinldng return on investment or profit margins yet."
The core problem was simple:
the skills required to execute an
effective external growth and development strategy differ from those
required to implement an internal
strategy. External growth places
greater strains on internal capital
and requires expertise in other
FIU Hospitality Review
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industry segments. Howard
Johnson's was not prepared to meet
this challenge.
Clearly, there was a strategy,
but without the heart. The commitment to a single direction was
lacking. The company expanded
into new markets, but its core
competency- the coffee shoplfamily
dining segment - was left in shambles. Yet it was this segment which
represented the bulk of revenues,
and it quickly slid as the 1980s
progressed. Hence, Howard
Johnson's developed into a classic
case of a company that was "stuck
in the middle.nsB
Howard Johnson's provides
researchers, practitioners, and
students with an excellent opportunity to study an organization that
once revolutionized an industry
segment and later spiraled downward in decline. Inherent in the
issues is the idea that organizationalsuccess is a temporal concept,
and yesterday's achievements ultimately have little to do with
tomorrow's performance. These
lessons are especially noteworthy in
today's fast-paced business environment where both business startups and dissolutions are occurring
at record paces. Indeed, history will
remember Howard Johnson's for
both its success and failures.
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